Saturday, March 26, 2005
Francisco Alvarado MacDonald
Clandestine Powers: In March 2001, the Guatemalan government deposited a total of 1.2 billion quetzals (about US$157 million) in two banks – Banco Promotor and Banco Metropolitano – which were known to have serious financial problems. These “Twin Banks,” as they came to be known, were owned by Francisco Alvarado MacDonald, a close friend of President Portillo’s.
Alvarado MacDonald had bankrolled Portillo’s election campaign, co-signed the rental agreement on his mansion, and lent him money for his Mercedes Benz and for other cars used by his bodyguards.
Despite the infusion of cash, both banks went bankrupt and there were large losses for account holders and for the national treasury. In July 2001, Judge Marco Antonio Posadas Pichillá upheld a temporary motion that blocked the take-over of the banks by government authorities. Newspaper articles noted that Posadas Pichillá’s ruling overstepped the bounds of his judicial authority in order to protect Alvarado MacDonald’s interests. A counter suit was filed against the judge on charges of corruption.
In addition, Alvarado MacDonald filed a civil suit against members of the Monetary Board (Junta Monetaria), the government entity responsible for authorizing state intervention in the banks. The suit sought compensation from Monetary Board members for the losses that Alvarado McDonald suffered as a result of the Board’s intervention in the two banks. Civil judges allowed the suit to proceed.
In 2001, the General Supervisor of Tribunals (SGT) reviewed complaints against Posadas Pichillá in conjunction with his investigation of the fraud that bankrupted the “Twin Banks.” Judge Pichillá was removed from the bench as a result of the findings of the SGT. The U.S. Department of State reported that, “There were credible allegations that Alvarado MacDonald used his financial and political power to influence the handling of the case.”
Lizardo Sosa, president of the Central Bank of Guatemala and a member of the Monetary Board, firmly supported intervention in the “Twin Banks.” He was kidnapped in the early hours of February 25, 2002 while jogging near his home. The crime was widely viewed as political in nature. A ransom was paid and 72 hours later, Sosa was freed.
A few days later, a shoot-out ensued in Guatemala City, killing two army officers and wounding three members of the National Civilian Police (Policía Nacional Civil, PNC). One of the officers killed, who reportedly was dressed in civilian clothing, was shot after allegedly having shouted, “Don’t Shoot! We’re the same as you!” Government officials maintained that the incident resulted from poor communication during a joint operation. Witnesses told the press, however, that they believed the army officers were there to transport Sosa’s ransom money.
After El Periódico newspaper reported on irregularities in finance and luxury car import businesses belonging to Alvarado MacDonald, journalist Silvia Gereda was kidnapped. She was one of the main people responsible for the newspaper’s investigative reporting on these matters.
In early 2002, the United States revoked the visas of Alvarado McDonald and his two sons, Carlos Alvarado and Francisco Alvarado, under a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act pertaining to individuals currently under criminal investigation. To date, 43 charges have been brought against Alvarado McDonald accusing him of contraband, falsification of private documents, illicit granting of loans, and improper withholding, among others. Thus far McDonald has managed to avoid prosecution through the use of multiple dilatory appeals and motions. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America) More from Banco de Guatemala June 2004.
Alvarado MacDonald had bankrolled Portillo’s election campaign, co-signed the rental agreement on his mansion, and lent him money for his Mercedes Benz and for other cars used by his bodyguards.
Despite the infusion of cash, both banks went bankrupt and there were large losses for account holders and for the national treasury. In July 2001, Judge Marco Antonio Posadas Pichillá upheld a temporary motion that blocked the take-over of the banks by government authorities. Newspaper articles noted that Posadas Pichillá’s ruling overstepped the bounds of his judicial authority in order to protect Alvarado MacDonald’s interests. A counter suit was filed against the judge on charges of corruption.
In addition, Alvarado MacDonald filed a civil suit against members of the Monetary Board (Junta Monetaria), the government entity responsible for authorizing state intervention in the banks. The suit sought compensation from Monetary Board members for the losses that Alvarado McDonald suffered as a result of the Board’s intervention in the two banks. Civil judges allowed the suit to proceed.
In 2001, the General Supervisor of Tribunals (SGT) reviewed complaints against Posadas Pichillá in conjunction with his investigation of the fraud that bankrupted the “Twin Banks.” Judge Pichillá was removed from the bench as a result of the findings of the SGT. The U.S. Department of State reported that, “There were credible allegations that Alvarado MacDonald used his financial and political power to influence the handling of the case.”
Lizardo Sosa, president of the Central Bank of Guatemala and a member of the Monetary Board, firmly supported intervention in the “Twin Banks.” He was kidnapped in the early hours of February 25, 2002 while jogging near his home. The crime was widely viewed as political in nature. A ransom was paid and 72 hours later, Sosa was freed.
A few days later, a shoot-out ensued in Guatemala City, killing two army officers and wounding three members of the National Civilian Police (Policía Nacional Civil, PNC). One of the officers killed, who reportedly was dressed in civilian clothing, was shot after allegedly having shouted, “Don’t Shoot! We’re the same as you!” Government officials maintained that the incident resulted from poor communication during a joint operation. Witnesses told the press, however, that they believed the army officers were there to transport Sosa’s ransom money.
After El Periódico newspaper reported on irregularities in finance and luxury car import businesses belonging to Alvarado MacDonald, journalist Silvia Gereda was kidnapped. She was one of the main people responsible for the newspaper’s investigative reporting on these matters.
In early 2002, the United States revoked the visas of Alvarado McDonald and his two sons, Carlos Alvarado and Francisco Alvarado, under a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act pertaining to individuals currently under criminal investigation. To date, 43 charges have been brought against Alvarado McDonald accusing him of contraband, falsification of private documents, illicit granting of loans, and improper withholding, among others. Thus far McDonald has managed to avoid prosecution through the use of multiple dilatory appeals and motions. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America) More from Banco de Guatemala June 2004.
Col. Napoleon Rojas Mendez
Clandestine Powers: In 1989, Napoleón Rojas Méndez worked at the Army Intelligence Directorate (D-2). In this capacity, he reportedly participated in the attempted coup against President Vinicio Cerezo. In 1996, he was dismissed from the army because of his involvement in Alfredo Moreno’s contraband operations. Rojas served as security advisor to President Portillo.
In November 2002, the United States revoked Rojas’ visa due to suspicion of involvement in organized crime, drug trafficking, contraband, and human rights violations. Rojas is one of the five high-ranking retired military officers under investigation by the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) for ties to organized crime.
In March 2003, in response to an inquiry by the special prosecutorinvestigating the case, President Portillo submitted a report to the Public Ministry regarding his relationship with Rojas. In the report, Portillo confirmed that Rojas had served as his security advisor and had even accompanied him on a number of official trips. Eight months later, the Constitutional Court filed a motion in favor of Rojas, giving the Public Ministry 30 days to present its case against him. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
In November 2002, the United States revoked Rojas’ visa due to suspicion of involvement in organized crime, drug trafficking, contraband, and human rights violations. Rojas is one of the five high-ranking retired military officers under investigation by the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) for ties to organized crime.
In March 2003, in response to an inquiry by the special prosecutorinvestigating the case, President Portillo submitted a report to the Public Ministry regarding his relationship with Rojas. In the report, Portillo confirmed that Rojas had served as his security advisor and had even accompanied him on a number of official trips. Eight months later, the Constitutional Court filed a motion in favor of Rojas, giving the Public Ministry 30 days to present its case against him. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
Col. Jacobo Esdras Salan Sanchez
Clandestine Powers: A 1974 graduate of the School of the Americas and a 1979 graduate of the military academy (Escuela Politécnica), Jacobo Esdras Salán Sánchez is said to be a member of La Cofradía. He worked at the Army Intelligence Directorate (D-2) in the late 80s and 90s. In 1996, he was dismissed from the army because of his involvement in the contraband ring run by Alfredo Moreno.
Salán has been accused by numerous human rights organizations of participation in the 1989 kidnapping and assassination of several students from the University of San Carlos, and in the 1990 murder of U.S. citizen Michael Devine. Salán headed Alfonso Portillo’s security detail during the electoral campaign. When Portillo became president, Salán became the de facto head of the Presidential General Staff (EMP).
Portillo’s closeness with Salán drew criticism from the U.S. Embassy and human rights organizations. Sources indicate that Salán fell out of favor with the United States for stealing goods that had been confiscated from drug traffickers when he was involved in counter-narcotics operations. In 2000, the U.S. Embassy “extra-officially” asked for his removal due to his ties with drug trafficking.
On May 11, 2000, a previously unknown group, the Association of Military Officers Against Impunity (Asociación de Militares Contra la Impunidad, AMCI) accused Salán of involvement in multiple cases of violations of human rights, illegal enrichment, and of participation in criminal networks. The group alleged that Salán and his criminal network were currently undertaking persecutions and tapping cellular phones.
Mario Polanco from the Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo, GAM) of family members of the disappeared and detained went a step further, voicing the opinion that the armed forces
A few days later, it was alleged that Salán was heading an illegal espionage network, orchestrated by Ortega Menaldo, which provided information to the president.
After a series of allegations, in mid-2000 Salán stepped down and Portillo tried to distance himself from Salán. In an interview with Prensa Libre, Salán explained that he left “out of friendship, because I believe that the criticisms about me are affecting the President.” Despite U.S. pressure, the distance taking was rhetorical. Salán continued to serve as Portillo’s advisor. A presidential order made him responsible for the logistics of Plan Puebla Panamá, a region-wide infrastructure development plan.
On October 23, 2002, Attorney General Carlos de León Argueta announced that Salán was one of the five retired military officers that the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) would investigate for alleged involvement in organized crime. The investigation is still underway, with little visible progress. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
Salán has been accused by numerous human rights organizations of participation in the 1989 kidnapping and assassination of several students from the University of San Carlos, and in the 1990 murder of U.S. citizen Michael Devine. Salán headed Alfonso Portillo’s security detail during the electoral campaign. When Portillo became president, Salán became the de facto head of the Presidential General Staff (EMP).
Portillo’s closeness with Salán drew criticism from the U.S. Embassy and human rights organizations. Sources indicate that Salán fell out of favor with the United States for stealing goods that had been confiscated from drug traffickers when he was involved in counter-narcotics operations. In 2000, the U.S. Embassy “extra-officially” asked for his removal due to his ties with drug trafficking.
On May 11, 2000, a previously unknown group, the Association of Military Officers Against Impunity (Asociación de Militares Contra la Impunidad, AMCI) accused Salán of involvement in multiple cases of violations of human rights, illegal enrichment, and of participation in criminal networks. The group alleged that Salán and his criminal network were currently undertaking persecutions and tapping cellular phones.
Mario Polanco from the Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo, GAM) of family members of the disappeared and detained went a step further, voicing the opinion that the armed forces
“should be subordinate to the President and to the Minister, not to parallel groups that wield influence in all decisions.”Although Portillo has made assurances that Ortega Menaldo had nothing to do with his government, active duty officers who requested anonymity have commented that the opinion of this former military leader is determinate in decision-making.
A few days later, it was alleged that Salán was heading an illegal espionage network, orchestrated by Ortega Menaldo, which provided information to the president.
After a series of allegations, in mid-2000 Salán stepped down and Portillo tried to distance himself from Salán. In an interview with Prensa Libre, Salán explained that he left “out of friendship, because I believe that the criticisms about me are affecting the President.” Despite U.S. pressure, the distance taking was rhetorical. Salán continued to serve as Portillo’s advisor. A presidential order made him responsible for the logistics of Plan Puebla Panamá, a region-wide infrastructure development plan.
On October 23, 2002, Attorney General Carlos de León Argueta announced that Salán was one of the five retired military officers that the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) would investigate for alleged involvement in organized crime. The investigation is still underway, with little visible progress. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
Alfredo Moreno Molina
Clandestine Powers: The case of the Moreno network clearly illustrates the reach of the hidden powers in Guatemala – their illicit activities, insidious linkages and structure. A vast array of military and government officials – some retired and some current office holders – were involved in the Moreno network.
1970s: Salvadoran-born Alfredo Moreno Molina was assigned by the Guatemalan military to work with counter-insurgency efforts within Customs. Over time he built and oversaw an illegal network involvingpersonnel at different border crossing points.
1989: Within the Moreno network a smaller, more exclusive group was formed that called itself the Grupo Salvavidas or “Lifesaver Group.” The Salvavidas was an effort to intentionally put together a powerful network of men with influence in and connections to all spheres of public and politicallife in the country. Other key members included Justice of the Peace Osmundo Waldimir Villatoro Escobar, Judge Rolando Sagastume and Col. Jacobo Esdras Salán Sánchez.
14 September 1996: An investigation carried out by Defense Minister Julio Balconi Turcios concluded that Moreno had committed the crimes of tax fraud, falsification or alteration of documents, and illicit enrichment. The evidence implicated numerous high-ranking military officers and high-profile civilians, among them Gen. Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo, Col. Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera, Gen. Roberto Eduardo Letona Hora, Maj. Fernández Ligorría, Col. Salán Sánchez, Alfonso Portillo, Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, Col.Napoleón Rojas Méndez, Maj. Byron Barrientos and Mario Guillermo Ruiz Wong.
16 September 1996: Then-presidential contender Alfonso Portillo, candidate of the FRG, admitted having received a 70,000 quetzals (approximately US$11,667) campaign contribution from Moreno, but claimed thathe had no knowledge of Moreno’s involvement in illegal activities.
17 September 1996: The Interior, Defense and Finance Ministers held a press conference to announce the dismissal of 27 officers from within the military and the police, among them Gen. Ortega Menaldo, Col.Salán Sánchez, Col. Oliva Carrera and Col. Napoleón Rojas Méndez.
18 September 1996: Presidential spokesman Ricardo de la Torre said that calculations were still being made, but it appeared that Moreno had evaded paying taxes on approximately 80 million quetzals (about US$15 million) per month over at least ten years.
27 September 1996: The prosecutors in charge of investigating Moreno reported that they had been repeatedly threatened and told not to move forward with the investigation or to bring the case to trial.
November 1996: The Public Ministry informed the press that Portillo received large quantities of money from Moreno during his unsuccessful bid for the presidency against victorious National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional, PAN) presidential candidate Alvaro Arzú.
December 1998: The Fifth Sentencing Court absolved Moreno for the crime of tax fraud. The Tenth Court of Appeals, presided over by Judge Ruiz Wong who himself had been implicated in the Moreno case, upheld that verdict. The Supreme Court annulled the ruling and ordered that the case be reheard by an appeals court.
24 May 1999: Four witnesses linked Moreno to military officers and politicians. They indicated that “take” from the contraband was turned over weekly to judges, lawyers, Moreno family members and military officers. Allegedly Col. Salán Sánchez and Gen. Letona Hora each received 5,000 quetzals (about US$833) a week.
January 2000: After Portillo of the FRG won the presidency, the new attorney general, Rodolfo González Rodas, decided to close the Special Cases Unit that had been handling the Moreno case and investigating Moreno’s connections with Portillo and Ríos Montt. The case was reassigned to the Office of the Prosecutor Against Organized Crime.
21 January 2000: The Court of Appeals, presided over by Judge Yolanda Pérez, upheld Moreno’s absolution for the fourth time on a technicality because the appeal was formulated improperly. In press statements, Moreno triumphantly declared that the case against him “is political … nothing has been proven against me.”
21 January 2001: Elio Sánchez, Gen. Ortega Menaldo and other individuals linked to the Moreno case managed to avoid pre-trial detention and were released on their own recognizance.
13 February 2001: The Sentencing Court presided over by Judge Sandra Ciudad Real revoked the order to imprison Moreno until the trial and ordered him freed upon payment of three million quetzals (aboutUS$389,600) in bail. Moreno was ordered to sign in every Monday and forbidden from leaving the country. The defense lawyer argued that Moreno did not have sufficient funds to make bail, and requested that the freeze on his properties be lifted to make available the required amount.
22 May 2001: The Criminal Sentencing Court ordered the lifting of the freeze on Moreno’s assets to allow him to raise money to make bail.
27 July 2001: The Criminal Sentencing Court reduced Moreno’s bail to one million quetzals (about US$128,370) although the Public Ministry calculated that he had defrauded the nation of approximately US$20 million.
11 December 2001: Moreno paid one million quetzals (about US$130,317) in bail and was released from prison.
29 March 2002: The Fourth Court of Appeals suspended the arrest warrant issued thirteen days earlier by the Sentencing Court against Moreno’s wife, Manuela Lucinda González, for failing to pay the 1.2 million quetzals (about US$151,900) in fines ordered in 2000. More than seven years after Moreno and key members of his network were charged with contraband, customs fraud, material falsehood and bribery, the case is still pending before the Sentencing Court in Mixco. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
1970s: Salvadoran-born Alfredo Moreno Molina was assigned by the Guatemalan military to work with counter-insurgency efforts within Customs. Over time he built and oversaw an illegal network involvingpersonnel at different border crossing points.
1989: Within the Moreno network a smaller, more exclusive group was formed that called itself the Grupo Salvavidas or “Lifesaver Group.” The Salvavidas was an effort to intentionally put together a powerful network of men with influence in and connections to all spheres of public and politicallife in the country. Other key members included Justice of the Peace Osmundo Waldimir Villatoro Escobar, Judge Rolando Sagastume and Col. Jacobo Esdras Salán Sánchez.
14 September 1996: An investigation carried out by Defense Minister Julio Balconi Turcios concluded that Moreno had committed the crimes of tax fraud, falsification or alteration of documents, and illicit enrichment. The evidence implicated numerous high-ranking military officers and high-profile civilians, among them Gen. Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo, Col. Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera, Gen. Roberto Eduardo Letona Hora, Maj. Fernández Ligorría, Col. Salán Sánchez, Alfonso Portillo, Gen. Efraín Ríos Montt, Col.Napoleón Rojas Méndez, Maj. Byron Barrientos and Mario Guillermo Ruiz Wong.
16 September 1996: Then-presidential contender Alfonso Portillo, candidate of the FRG, admitted having received a 70,000 quetzals (approximately US$11,667) campaign contribution from Moreno, but claimed thathe had no knowledge of Moreno’s involvement in illegal activities.
17 September 1996: The Interior, Defense and Finance Ministers held a press conference to announce the dismissal of 27 officers from within the military and the police, among them Gen. Ortega Menaldo, Col.Salán Sánchez, Col. Oliva Carrera and Col. Napoleón Rojas Méndez.
18 September 1996: Presidential spokesman Ricardo de la Torre said that calculations were still being made, but it appeared that Moreno had evaded paying taxes on approximately 80 million quetzals (about US$15 million) per month over at least ten years.
27 September 1996: The prosecutors in charge of investigating Moreno reported that they had been repeatedly threatened and told not to move forward with the investigation or to bring the case to trial.
November 1996: The Public Ministry informed the press that Portillo received large quantities of money from Moreno during his unsuccessful bid for the presidency against victorious National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional, PAN) presidential candidate Alvaro Arzú.
December 1998: The Fifth Sentencing Court absolved Moreno for the crime of tax fraud. The Tenth Court of Appeals, presided over by Judge Ruiz Wong who himself had been implicated in the Moreno case, upheld that verdict. The Supreme Court annulled the ruling and ordered that the case be reheard by an appeals court.
24 May 1999: Four witnesses linked Moreno to military officers and politicians. They indicated that “take” from the contraband was turned over weekly to judges, lawyers, Moreno family members and military officers. Allegedly Col. Salán Sánchez and Gen. Letona Hora each received 5,000 quetzals (about US$833) a week.
January 2000: After Portillo of the FRG won the presidency, the new attorney general, Rodolfo González Rodas, decided to close the Special Cases Unit that had been handling the Moreno case and investigating Moreno’s connections with Portillo and Ríos Montt. The case was reassigned to the Office of the Prosecutor Against Organized Crime.
21 January 2000: The Court of Appeals, presided over by Judge Yolanda Pérez, upheld Moreno’s absolution for the fourth time on a technicality because the appeal was formulated improperly. In press statements, Moreno triumphantly declared that the case against him “is political … nothing has been proven against me.”
21 January 2001: Elio Sánchez, Gen. Ortega Menaldo and other individuals linked to the Moreno case managed to avoid pre-trial detention and were released on their own recognizance.
13 February 2001: The Sentencing Court presided over by Judge Sandra Ciudad Real revoked the order to imprison Moreno until the trial and ordered him freed upon payment of three million quetzals (aboutUS$389,600) in bail. Moreno was ordered to sign in every Monday and forbidden from leaving the country. The defense lawyer argued that Moreno did not have sufficient funds to make bail, and requested that the freeze on his properties be lifted to make available the required amount.
22 May 2001: The Criminal Sentencing Court ordered the lifting of the freeze on Moreno’s assets to allow him to raise money to make bail.
27 July 2001: The Criminal Sentencing Court reduced Moreno’s bail to one million quetzals (about US$128,370) although the Public Ministry calculated that he had defrauded the nation of approximately US$20 million.
11 December 2001: Moreno paid one million quetzals (about US$130,317) in bail and was released from prison.
29 March 2002: The Fourth Court of Appeals suspended the arrest warrant issued thirteen days earlier by the Sentencing Court against Moreno’s wife, Manuela Lucinda González, for failing to pay the 1.2 million quetzals (about US$151,900) in fines ordered in 2000. More than seven years after Moreno and key members of his network were charged with contraband, customs fraud, material falsehood and bribery, the case is still pending before the Sentencing Court in Mixco. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
Brig. Gen. Luis Felipe Miranda Trejo
Clandestine Powers: From 1979 through 1983 Luis Felipe Miranda Trejo served as a military intelligence officer in three different locations and headed the Center for Training and Special Operations of the Kaibiles (elite counter-insurgency forces). He later became the commander of various military zones, including Puerto Barrios, Escuintla, Playa Grande, and Huehuetenango. During the Serrano Elías administration he was commander of the Mobile Military Police (Policía Militar Ambulante, PMA).
During his tenure as commander of Military Zone No.19 in Huehuetenangoin 1994, Miranda Trejo was accused of forcibly recruiting young indigenous men into the military. As a result of the controversy that followed and a number of civil charges brought against him, he was dismissed from his post during Ramiro de León Carpio’s government.
After the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, Miranda Trejo retired from the army. In November 1999, Trejo was elected in Huehuetenango as an FRG deputy to the Guatemalan Congress. As deputy, he served on the legislative Commission for National Defense where he argued for increased funding for the Guatemalan military. Miranda Trejo has been implicated in various human rights violations. He allegedly sought to block the investigation of the 1990 assassination of U.S. citizen Michael Devine. He commanded the military base from which Captain Hugo Contreras, who was implicated in Devine’s assassination, supposedly escaped.
In 1998, a court in Quetzaltenango opened proceedings against Miranda Trejo as the alleged intellectual author of the 1993 killing of activist Juan Pablo Chanay during a demonstration. He was commander of Military Zone No.19 at the time of Chanay’s murder. In 1998, eleven former members of the Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PACs) were convicted for their participation in the murder. Three months later, however, they were freed from a police station by an armed mob. At the time, the investigation against Miranda Trejo remained open. There still has been no progress in the investigation due inlarge part to the immunity that Trejo enjoyed as a deputy in the Congress.
On March 14, 2002, Miranda Trejo was appointed by President Alfonso Portillo to serve as director of the Guatemalan Institute for Tourism (INGUAT). Shortly thereafter, workers complained that he was “militarizing the institution.” They cited Miranda’s hiring of retired General Jorge Perussina as one of his chief advisors.
Miranda Trejo promoted the integration of ex-PAC members into local FRG chapters, and then later was on the governmental commission that negotiated with the former PACs regarding their demands for economic compensation. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
During his tenure as commander of Military Zone No.19 in Huehuetenangoin 1994, Miranda Trejo was accused of forcibly recruiting young indigenous men into the military. As a result of the controversy that followed and a number of civil charges brought against him, he was dismissed from his post during Ramiro de León Carpio’s government.
After the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, Miranda Trejo retired from the army. In November 1999, Trejo was elected in Huehuetenango as an FRG deputy to the Guatemalan Congress. As deputy, he served on the legislative Commission for National Defense where he argued for increased funding for the Guatemalan military. Miranda Trejo has been implicated in various human rights violations. He allegedly sought to block the investigation of the 1990 assassination of U.S. citizen Michael Devine. He commanded the military base from which Captain Hugo Contreras, who was implicated in Devine’s assassination, supposedly escaped.
In 1998, a court in Quetzaltenango opened proceedings against Miranda Trejo as the alleged intellectual author of the 1993 killing of activist Juan Pablo Chanay during a demonstration. He was commander of Military Zone No.19 at the time of Chanay’s murder. In 1998, eleven former members of the Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PACs) were convicted for their participation in the murder. Three months later, however, they were freed from a police station by an armed mob. At the time, the investigation against Miranda Trejo remained open. There still has been no progress in the investigation due inlarge part to the immunity that Trejo enjoyed as a deputy in the Congress.
On March 14, 2002, Miranda Trejo was appointed by President Alfonso Portillo to serve as director of the Guatemalan Institute for Tourism (INGUAT). Shortly thereafter, workers complained that he was “militarizing the institution.” They cited Miranda’s hiring of retired General Jorge Perussina as one of his chief advisors.
Miranda Trejo promoted the integration of ex-PAC members into local FRG chapters, and then later was on the governmental commission that negotiated with the former PACs regarding their demands for economic compensation. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
Col. Juan Guillermo Oliva Carrera
Clandestine Powers: Shortly after graduating from the military academy (Escuela Politécnica) in 1975, Guillermo Oliva Carrera was appointed squad commander of the Quetzaltenango Brigade. Two years later, he served as squad commander of the Military Zone in the Petén. Later that same year, Oliva Carrera became an instructor at the School of the Kaibiles (Escuela Kaibil), where elite counter-insurgency forces of the army were trained. In the early 80s, he served as a military intelligence officer in different locations. In 1986, he became an assistant at the Military High Command (Estado Mayor de la Defensa), and in1987 he joined the Army Intelligence Directorate (D-2). From 1988 to1991, he was appointed sub-director of the Archivo, the intelligence division of the EMP. The following year he returned to the D-2. In 1996, Oliva Carrera was dismissed from the army for his involvement in Alfredo Moreno’s contraband operations.
Oliva Carrera was indicted in 2002 and put on trial along with two other high-level military officers for masterminding the 1990 assassination of anthropologist Myrna Mack. In October 2002, he was acquitted after a three-judge panel found insufficient evidence of his direct involvement in the crime. His acquittal was upheld by an appeals court in May 2003.
In April 2002, the sister of Myrna, Helen Mack, obtained a document from an anonymous source that alleged possible links between Oliva Carrera and clandestine groups. In a private meeting Mack gave President Portillo the document and urged him to investigate the allegations and to bring those responsible for crimes to justice, including, possibly, Oliva Carrera. President Alfonso Portillo subsequently made this information public in a radio interview. Following the interview, Oliva Carrera brought a criminal defamation suit against Mack. Four months later, an appeals court annulled the suit on the grounds that there was no basis for the criminal complaint. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
Oliva Carrera was indicted in 2002 and put on trial along with two other high-level military officers for masterminding the 1990 assassination of anthropologist Myrna Mack. In October 2002, he was acquitted after a three-judge panel found insufficient evidence of his direct involvement in the crime. His acquittal was upheld by an appeals court in May 2003.
In April 2002, the sister of Myrna, Helen Mack, obtained a document from an anonymous source that alleged possible links between Oliva Carrera and clandestine groups. In a private meeting Mack gave President Portillo the document and urged him to investigate the allegations and to bring those responsible for crimes to justice, including, possibly, Oliva Carrera. President Alfonso Portillo subsequently made this information public in a radio interview. Following the interview, Oliva Carrera brought a criminal defamation suit against Mack. Four months later, an appeals court annulled the suit on the grounds that there was no basis for the criminal complaint. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
Gen. Otto Perez Molina
Clandestine Powers: A 1973 graduate of the military academy (Escuela Politécnica), Otto Pérez Molina (born 01/12/1950) is said to be one of the prominent leaders of 'El Sindicato'. From 1992 to 1993, Pérez Molina served as head of the Army Intelligence Directorate (D-2). In 1993, he led the group of military officers who opposed then- President Elías Serrano’s auto-golpe (self imposed coup). In the aftermath, he replaced Francisco Ortega Menaldo as head of the Presidential General Staff (EMP). This sequence of events sparked an intense rivalry between the two men that continues to this day. Perez Molina was head of the EMP when Jorge Carpio Nicolle was assasinated.
Pérez Molina has played a complicated role in Guatemala. Appointed Inspector General of the Army (Inspector General del Ejército) in 1996, Pérez Molina was the Guatemalan military’s representative at the negotiations of the Peace Accords between the guerrillas and the government. Two years later Pérez Molina went to Washington, DC to head the Guatemalan delegation before the Inter-American Defense Board. He was forced into retirement at the beginning of the Portillo administration. Pérez Molina has been implicated in a number of human rights violations. According to the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala (ODHAG), there is evidence that links the EMP with the 1994 assassination of Judge Edgar Ramiro Elías Ogaldez.
General Héctor Alejandro Gramajo, who served as Defense Minister from January 1987 to May 1990, once described this strategy more crassly, stating:
Pérez Molina’s role as a leader of the network of current and retired military officers known as the El Sindicato has put him in the company of men, such as Gen. Roberto Letona Hora, who have been accused of corruption. Peréz Molina fiercely criticized the Portillo administration for undue political influence of ex-military officers connected to military intelligence.
On February 24, 2001, Pérez Molina formed the Patriot Party (Partido Patriota, PP). In March 2002, Pérez Molina and his political allies, including the presidential candidate of the National Unity of Hope (Unidad Nueva Esperanza, UNE) Álvaro Colom, led a march of about 3,000 demonstrators through the capital to demand the resignation of President Portillo and Vice President Francisco Reyes López because of their alleged funneling of state resources into bankaccounts in Panama.
In 2003, the Patriot Party banded together with the Reform Movement (Movimiento Reformador, MR) and the National Solidarity Party (Partido de Solidaridad Nacional, PSN) to form the Great National Alliance (Gran Alianza Nacional, GANA) coalition. On November 9, 2003, Pérez Molina was selected a deputy to the Guatemalan Congress for GANA. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
According to Fundacion Myrna Mack, Perez Molina has been fortunate that Berger needed party political backing, which perhaps gave the Patriot Party a better showing at the polls as part of GANA. Perez Molina was Commisioner for Security, but left after disagreements, ostensibly for Berger's contact with Rios Montt.
According to the Interior Ministry, Perez Molina has been an assassination target with three others, for his role in apprehending Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, a Mexican drug trafficker. He escaped from prison in Mexico in January, 2001. In March, 2005, wanted posters and a $5 million cash reward has been offered for his arrest from the DEA - http://crime.about.com/od/wanted/a/chapo_reward.htm
Pérez Molina has played a complicated role in Guatemala. Appointed Inspector General of the Army (Inspector General del Ejército) in 1996, Pérez Molina was the Guatemalan military’s representative at the negotiations of the Peace Accords between the guerrillas and the government. Two years later Pérez Molina went to Washington, DC to head the Guatemalan delegation before the Inter-American Defense Board. He was forced into retirement at the beginning of the Portillo administration. Pérez Molina has been implicated in a number of human rights violations. According to the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala (ODHAG), there is evidence that links the EMP with the 1994 assassination of Judge Edgar Ramiro Elías Ogaldez.
General Héctor Alejandro Gramajo, who served as Defense Minister from January 1987 to May 1990, once described this strategy more crassly, stating:
“You needn’t kill everyone to complete the job.... We instituted Civil Affairs, which provides development for seventy percent of the population, while we kill thirty percent.”He has also been implicated in the murder of guerrilla leader Efraín Bámaca. According to press accounts, a detailed document delivered to the U.S. Embassy in 1996 revealed that Bámaca’s fate was weighed by military leadership. The document stated that it was Pérez Molina, then head of theEMP, who ordered two of his officers “to make Bámaca disappear.”
Pérez Molina’s role as a leader of the network of current and retired military officers known as the El Sindicato has put him in the company of men, such as Gen. Roberto Letona Hora, who have been accused of corruption. Peréz Molina fiercely criticized the Portillo administration for undue political influence of ex-military officers connected to military intelligence.
On February 24, 2001, Pérez Molina formed the Patriot Party (Partido Patriota, PP). In March 2002, Pérez Molina and his political allies, including the presidential candidate of the National Unity of Hope (Unidad Nueva Esperanza, UNE) Álvaro Colom, led a march of about 3,000 demonstrators through the capital to demand the resignation of President Portillo and Vice President Francisco Reyes López because of their alleged funneling of state resources into bankaccounts in Panama.
In 2003, the Patriot Party banded together with the Reform Movement (Movimiento Reformador, MR) and the National Solidarity Party (Partido de Solidaridad Nacional, PSN) to form the Great National Alliance (Gran Alianza Nacional, GANA) coalition. On November 9, 2003, Pérez Molina was selected a deputy to the Guatemalan Congress for GANA. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
According to Fundacion Myrna Mack, Perez Molina has been fortunate that Berger needed party political backing, which perhaps gave the Patriot Party a better showing at the polls as part of GANA. Perez Molina was Commisioner for Security, but left after disagreements, ostensibly for Berger's contact with Rios Montt.
According to the Interior Ministry, Perez Molina has been an assassination target with three others, for his role in apprehending Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, a Mexican drug trafficker. He escaped from prison in Mexico in January, 2001. In March, 2005, wanted posters and a $5 million cash reward has been offered for his arrest from the DEA - http://crime.about.com/od/wanted/a/chapo_reward.htm
Gen. Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo
Clandestine Powers: In the late 70s and early 80s, Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo worked in military intelligence out of an office in the Public Finance Ministry. He later served as sub-director, then director, of army intelligence. From 1991 to 1993, he was head of the Presidential General Staff (EMP). He reportedly was one of the most prominent supporters of President Serrano Elias’ unsuccessful effort to seize unconstitutional powers in an “auto-golpe” (self-imposed coup) in May 1993 (See REHMI).
Ortega Menaldo, a graduate from the notorious School of the Americas, was one of the chief architects of a powerful and sophisticated clandestine apparatus that grew out of the Public Finance Ministry- 'La Cofradía' with other retired Gen. Manuel Callejas y Callejas, ex-head of Customs Agency, which brings together members of military intelligence since the days of Lucas Garcia. In the late 70s, the Guatemalan army established an office in the Finance Ministry to detect the traffic of weapons destined for leftist armed groups. Ortega Menaldo was a key player there (1978-1982).
Ortega Menaldo networked to expand his reach into other state institutions and to carry out his own contraband operations, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. During Ortega Menaldo’s tenure as head of army intelligence, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) coordinated its operations with military intelligence.
Ortega Menaldo allegedly recruited some of his closest confidants – including Col. Esdras Salán Sánchez, Gen. Robin Macloni Morán Muñoz, Col. Napoleón Rojas Méndez, and Lt. Col. Rolando Díaz Barrios – and used the information that he obtained to expand and assure impunity for the drug trafficking activities in which he and his cronies were involved.
In this same period, the DEA and the CIA financed new equipment and enhanced military intelligence’s technological ability to monitor and intercept telephone communications. To this day, Ortega Menaldo and others involved in clandestine groups allegedly use this equipment, until recently operated by the EMP, to conduct illegal espionage against their opponents.
In 1996, under President Arzú, Gen. Ortega Menaldo agreed to retire because of his involvement in a major contraband ring headed by Alfredo Moreno Molina.
With the electoral victory of Alfonso Portillo, Ortega Menaldo recouped his stature as a power broker. Although he did not hold an official government position, Ortega Menaldo was presumed to have been one of the President Portillo’s top advisors. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
See also summary of Ortega Menaldo's network in a piece written by Jose Ruben Zamora, El Periodico (although badly translated)
Ortega Menaldo, a graduate from the notorious School of the Americas, was one of the chief architects of a powerful and sophisticated clandestine apparatus that grew out of the Public Finance Ministry- 'La Cofradía' with other retired Gen. Manuel Callejas y Callejas, ex-head of Customs Agency, which brings together members of military intelligence since the days of Lucas Garcia. In the late 70s, the Guatemalan army established an office in the Finance Ministry to detect the traffic of weapons destined for leftist armed groups. Ortega Menaldo was a key player there (1978-1982).
Ortega Menaldo networked to expand his reach into other state institutions and to carry out his own contraband operations, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. During Ortega Menaldo’s tenure as head of army intelligence, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) coordinated its operations with military intelligence.
Ortega Menaldo allegedly recruited some of his closest confidants – including Col. Esdras Salán Sánchez, Gen. Robin Macloni Morán Muñoz, Col. Napoleón Rojas Méndez, and Lt. Col. Rolando Díaz Barrios – and used the information that he obtained to expand and assure impunity for the drug trafficking activities in which he and his cronies were involved.
In this same period, the DEA and the CIA financed new equipment and enhanced military intelligence’s technological ability to monitor and intercept telephone communications. To this day, Ortega Menaldo and others involved in clandestine groups allegedly use this equipment, until recently operated by the EMP, to conduct illegal espionage against their opponents.
In 1996, under President Arzú, Gen. Ortega Menaldo agreed to retire because of his involvement in a major contraband ring headed by Alfredo Moreno Molina.
With the electoral victory of Alfonso Portillo, Ortega Menaldo recouped his stature as a power broker. Although he did not hold an official government position, Ortega Menaldo was presumed to have been one of the President Portillo’s top advisors. (SOURCE: Washington Office on Latin America)
See also summary of Ortega Menaldo's network in a piece written by Jose Ruben Zamora, El Periodico (although badly translated)
Friday, March 25, 2005
Rumsfeld: arms for Guatemala again...
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld announced Thursday that the United States would lift its ban on military aid to Guatemala... $3.2 million with more expected (economic assistance has exceded $100 million a year). This despite Berger having not proposed to cut the defence budget, according to figures from Colectivo de Organisaciones Sociales (Q950 million in 2003 and 2004). It is difficult to assess the exact figure, as there has been a tendency in the past to transfer monies from other budgets to the defence budget. Berger did this last year citing the need for the scaling down from 27,000 to 15,000 military personel.
"I've been impressed by the reforms that have been undertaken in the armed forces," Mr. Rumsfeld said at a joint news conference with President Óscar Berger of Guatemala. "I know it is a difficult thing to do but it's been done with professionalism and transparency."
Adriana Beltrán, an expert on Guatemala with the Washington Office on Latin America, a research institution, said Mr. Berger's government had done very little to stop private groups of gunmen from intimidating and killing people who were working to uncover past and present human rights abuses in Guatemala. Rewarding the government with arms sends the wrong message, she said. (New York Times 25-03-05)
U.S. officials estimate that 80 percent of cocaine headed for the U.S. market comes from land, sea or air routes through Guatemala, which borders southern Mexico. http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/20050324_296.html
"I've been impressed by the reforms that have been undertaken in the armed forces," Mr. Rumsfeld said at a joint news conference with President Óscar Berger of Guatemala. "I know it is a difficult thing to do but it's been done with professionalism and transparency."
Adriana Beltrán, an expert on Guatemala with the Washington Office on Latin America, a research institution, said Mr. Berger's government had done very little to stop private groups of gunmen from intimidating and killing people who were working to uncover past and present human rights abuses in Guatemala. Rewarding the government with arms sends the wrong message, she said. (New York Times 25-03-05)
U.S. officials estimate that 80 percent of cocaine headed for the U.S. market comes from land, sea or air routes through Guatemala, which borders southern Mexico. http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/20050324_296.html
Monday, March 21, 2005
Prevention of genocide...
As the word 'genocide' is tending to be air brushed out by certain sectors, than included in the current debate in Guatemala about national reconciliation, campaigns such as the following are more and more important: http://preventgenocide.org/americas/ Oscar Berger, who took office last year, said in Feb 2004 he was asking forgiveness from "every one of the victims' relatives for the suffering that came from that fratricidal conflict."
Thursday, March 17, 2005
Violence in the wake of the CAFTA protests
This is a link to video and photos taken during the violent disruption of a protest in the Puente Naranjales in Colotenango, Huehuetenango. Two protestors were killed, many others injured.
Saturday, March 12, 2005
Recent reports on the human rights situation in Guatemala
Here are a couple of reports on the recent human rights situation in Guatemala... first this from Amnesty International and this from the US Embassy in Guatemala http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/wwwhhre200501.html It is always consulting WOLA's report from 2003 on 'Hidden Powers in Post-Conflict Guatemala'. or see their executive summary from September 2004
Friday, March 11, 2005
Freedom of the press
This is an organisation producing interesting reports on the freedom of the press in Guatemala- any diversity in angles from the press in Guatemala is appreciated. What do you think? Reporteros Sin Fronteros
Sunday, March 06, 2005
The Environment in Guatemala
This is the link to a very interesting website about environmental issues in Guatemala. Colectivo Ecologista Madre Selva has great new information about how the Government is in the process of selling concessions to multinationals for mining and petrol... for the moment most of the site is in construction, but it should soon be uploaded. Also relevant here is CALAS El Centro de Acción Legal-Ambiental y Social de Guatemala... Mining and Communities website and Mining Watch Cananda have articles translated from Prensa Libre about the recent situation with the mines...
